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How will the European Court of Human Rights deal with the UK in 
Iraq? Extra-territorial jurisdiction, tensions between International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, and 
lessons from Turkey and Russia 
BILL BOWRING 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The invasion and occupation of Iraq have placed international law as a whole and human 
rights law in particular under extraordinary stress. In the face of brute and lawless force all 
normativity may appear to have evaporated from the international scene. Nevertheless, it is 
highly likely that in due course the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) will be called 
upon to adjudicate on complaints arising from the conduct of the United Kingdom, and 
possible other European states of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. My argument in this chapter 
is that significant normative and legal resources already exist in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, and that through the cases decided over the years, especially the Chechen cases, a 
wholly positive clarification of the relationship between International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHR) is already taking place. However, this 
process, on my account, can only be understood in the context of colonial and post-colonial 
armed struggles. 
In order to show this, I engage with two points of – apparently – positive legal doctrine; and a 
more general problem of human rights confronted by gross, widespread and systematic 
violations.   
The first point of doctrine is the question of the extra-territorial reach of human rights law. 
This question is far from technical in the current context. It is the question whether the UK 
can be condemned in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for some of its actions in 
Iraq – specifically, for those actions which violate the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). It is significant but not surprising that legal doctrine on this question has been 
developed in relation to Turkey and Russia.   
My second point of doctrine joins Vladimir Putin and Tony Blair in an unholy coupling. The 
technical issue is that the war in Iraq, like Russia’s own wars in Chechnya, throws into sharp 
relief a hitherto latent tension between the international law of human rights (IHR) and 
international humanitarian law (IHL), the international law of armed conflict. Is IHL a lex 
specialis which displaces IHR in the context of international or internal armed conflict? 
The general problem in question is the following. The ECHR and ECtHR were elaborated as 
an ideological instrument in the context of the onset of the Cold War.1 The UK was very 
reluctant to accept the creation of a Court capable of interfering in internal affairs and 
rendering obligatory judgments, but finally agreed in a spirit of solidarity against the threat of 
Communism.2 For the first three decades of the work of ECHR mechanisms the Court was for 
the most part called upon to deal with lapses, more or less inadvertent, by Western European 
                                                 
1 Brownlie, Ian and Goodwin-Gill, Guy (2006) Basic Documents on Human Rights 5th ed  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 609 
2 See Council of Europe Collected edition of the “Travaux préparatoires” of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in eight volumes (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975-1985) 
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states in which the rule of law and adherence to generally understood principles of democracy 
was not seriously in doubt. Even the many Northern Irish cases against the UK did nor 
present as the result of serious armed conflict. Only in the 1990s, with the tidal wave of 
Turkish Kurdish cases, especially those concerning village destruction, followed by the many 
Chechen cases against Russia, has the Court been obliged to confront the human rights 
consequences of armed conflict. The question is whether the concepts and systems developed 
in a quite different context half a century ago are remotely effective or indeed legitimate when 
the UK invades and occupies Iraq. 
It will be recalled that United Kingdom has been in Iraq before. As Joel Rayburn points out, 
the UK seized the provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the Ottoman Empire at the 
end of World War I and formally took control of the new country in 1920, under a mandate 
from the League of Nations. In 1920, a large-scale Shiite insurgency cost the British more 
than 2,000 casualties, and domestic pressure to withdraw from Iraq began to build. The UK’s 
premature pullout in 1932 led to more violence in Iraq, the rise of a dictatorship, and a 
catastrophic unravelling of everything the British had tried to build there.3 It may be that 
history repeats itself as farce; but this time there is an international mechanism which may see 
the UK called to account for its actions. 
 
2. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT 
The question of extra-territorial applicability of IHR has recently been the subject of intense 
scholarly engagement4. The key cases have arisen in the context of the application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This is because the consequences of the 
post-colonial if not imperial behaviour of Turkey, of the Russian Federation, and of the UK, 
have been adjudicated upon by judicial instances at the international level, and now in 
domestic courts as well. These are the cases where the armed forces of a State are alleged to 
have violated human rights outside the national territory. 
In this area, at least, international law demonstrates its resilience. Since the early 1990s, states 
have not, on balance, done well. Thus, Turkey lost in respect of its occupation of North 
Cyprus in the Loizidou case5, the UK together with other NATO members in the ECHR 
system had a close shave regarding the bombing of Serbia in the Bankovic case6, Russia has 
been condemned for its alleged occupation of part of Moldova7 in Ilascu v Moldova and 
Russia, and Turkey was once more found to be responsible for violations in neighbouring 
territory in Issa v Turkey.8 The Bankovic case has been described, by a leading judge of the 
Strasbourg Court, Loukis Loucaides, as ‘a set-back in the effort to achieve the effective 
                                                 
3 Rayburn, Joel “The Last Exit from Iraq” v.85 n.2 (2006) Foreign Affairs pp.29-40 
4 See Hampson, Francoise and Inrahim Salama ‘Working paper on the relationship between human rights law 
and humanitarian law’ Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, 53rd session, Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14, 21 June 2005 at 19-22; Lubell, Noam, ‘Challenges in 
applying human rights law to armed conflict’ (2005) 87:860 International Review of the Red Cross 737-754 at 
739-741; Leach, Philip ‘The British military in Iraq – the applicability of the espace juridique doctrine under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (Autumn 2005) Public Law 448-458  
5 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) 40/1993/435/514, paras 62-64 
6 Bankovic and others v Belgium and 16 other states, Application No.52207/99, decision of 12 December 2001 
7 Ilascu and others v Moldova and the Russian Federation, Romania intervening, Application No.48787/99, 
decision of 8 July 2004 
8 Issa and others v Turkey, Application no.31821/96, admissibility decision of 30 May 2000; decision of the 
second Chamber, 16 November 2004  
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promotion of and respect for human rights… in relation to the exercise of any State activity 
within or outside their country.’9 The UK’s occupation of Iraq is at the time of writing under 
scrutiny in the domestic courts in Al-Skeini10 and Al-Jedda11 - decisions in the lower courts 
are at the time of writing under scrutiny in the House of Lords, as I explain in more detail 
below. Writing in 2003, Vaughan Lowe suggested that in view of the principles set out in the 
Loizidou and Bankovic cases ‘the UK may in principle incur liability under the ECHR in 
respect of its conduct in areas where it is in military occupation and exercising governmental 
powers.’12 The crucial principle at stake is whether a state party to the ECHR can be in 
“effective control” outside its own territory or indeed outside the overall territory of the 
Council of Europe states so that the actions of its state agents can engage Convention rights.  
It should also be noted that the UN Human Rights Committee has interpreted this aspect of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  In its General Comment 
No 31, ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant’, which it adopted on 29 March 2004, it restated the relevant part of article 2(1) of 
the ICCPR and continued, at para 10: 
This means that a state party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power and effective control of that state party, even if 
not situated within the territory of that state party ... This principle “- of applicability 
to all individuals who may find themselves subject to the jurisdiction of the state 
party-” also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a 
state party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such 
power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national 
contingent of a state party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-
enforcement operation.13  
The question why there is a problem of the application of the ECHR at all is to be answered 
by reference to the history of the institution which gave birth to it, the Council of Europe. 
A. The Cold War Origins and Post-colonial Destiny of the Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe (CoE), which now comprises 47 states (since Montenegro voted to 
separate from Serbia), with a total population of some 850 million people, exemplifies one of 
the most poignant ironies of history. It was founded in 1949 in London, by the 10 Western 
European states which signed its Statute, as, quite self-consciously, ‘a sort of social and 
ideological counterpart to the military aspects of European co-operation represented by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.’14 The three ‘pillars’ of the CoE, which are exemplified 
                                                 
9 Loucaides, Loukis ‘Determining the Extra-territorial Effect of the European Convention: Facts, Jurisprudence 
and the Bankovic Case’ (2006) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 391-407. At note 2, p.392, Loucaides 
cites the large number of scholarly articles strongly criticising the decision. 
10 R (Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence, High Court 14 December 2004, Court of Appeal 21 
December 2005, [2005] EWCA Civ 1609; [2006] HRLR 7, now pending in the House of Lords.  
11 R (Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence, Court of Appeal  20 March 2006, 
C1/2005/2251, [2006] EWCA CIV 327 
12 Lowe, Vaughan ‘The Iraq Crisis: What Now?’ v.52 October, (2003) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 859-871,  at 869 
13 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, of 26 May 2004. See also the International Court of Justice in the recent Advisory 
Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ICJ 
Reps, 9 July 2004) at paras 108 and 109. 
14 These are the words of Professor Ian Brownlie, in  Brownlie, Ian and Goodwin-Gill, Guy (2006) Basic 
Documents on Human Rights (5th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press) at 609 
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in its more than 200 binding treaties are pluralist democracy, the rule of law, and protection of 
individual human rights. By promulgating the ECHR, and creating the ECtHR, the first 
international court with powers to interfere in the internal affairs of states and to render 
obligatory judgments against them, the CoE showed it was truly serious about the “first 
generation” of civil and political rights, especially personal liberty, freedom of expression, the 
right to compensation for deprivation of property, the right to free elections. It is notable that 
the list of rights contained in the ECHR does not depart significantly from the list in the 
French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. It contained 
no social, economic or cultural rights, largely at the insistence of the UK. The content of the 
ECHR contrasted strongly with the human rights guaranteed in the constitutions of the USSR 
and its subject states, all of which gave pride of place to the right to work, followed by rights 
to social security, healthcare, education and housing. These states could show that they were 
serious about the social and economic rights enshrined in their constitutions and, by and large, 
delivered them in practice. Indeed, not only did every person of working age have work, but it 
was a crime, the crime of ‘parasitism’, not to work.   
It should be no surprise that the UK was strongly resistant to the principle of obligatory 
judicial decisions at the international level. It remained determined that even if there was to be 
a Convention, there would be no court, at least for the UK. Thus, when, on 7 August 1950, the 
Committee of Ministers adopted a draft convention, weakened as a result of UK pressure, it 
made the right of individual petition conditional on a declaration of acceptance by the State 
Party, and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR optional.15 The UK’s Attorney-General, Shawcross, 
stated on 4 October 1950 that ‘we should refuse to accept the Court or the Commission as a 
Court of Appeal and should firmly set our faces against the right of individual petition which 
seems to me to be wholly opposed to the theory of responsible government.’16 On 18 October 
1950 there was a Ministerial Meeting of the ministers most directly concerned, and Shawcross 
advised that the ECHR was in essence a statement of the general principles of human rights in 
a democratic community, in contrast with their suppression under totalitarian government. 
There had been strong political pressure on the UK Government to agree to the Council of 
Europe Convention, and he felt that the wisest course was to accept it.17 
Why was the UK so reluctant to submit to such interference? Part of the answer, still relevant 
for my purposes, lies in the concerns that the ECHR might bring colonial matters under 
international scrutiny. This was borne out in two of the first cases decided against the UK 
directly concerned its colonial past18. 
One of the first such cases, decided in 1973, involved events taking place outside the UK, and 
indeed far from Europe.19 The UK's East African colony Uganda had an Asian population of 
many thousands, the descendants of Asians who had been brought by the British Empire from 
India, and who served as civil servants and ran shops and businesses. Uganda was granted 
independence in 1962. However, in January 1971 the elected President, Apolo Milton Obote, 
was overthrown by his army commander, Idi Amin Dada. The following year, as part of a 
                                                 
15 Trav Prep (ibid) Vol V, p.56 
16 LCO 2/5570 [3363/22] 
17 CAB 130/64 [GEN. 337/1st Meeting] 
18 See also the earlier case Kingdom of Greece v United Kingdom App.No. 176/56, Commission decision of 26 
September 1958, rejecting the complaints by Greece arising out of the conflict in Cyprus. It will be noted that the 
complaint by Greece was made, and the Commission decided, before the UK recognised – in 1966 – the right of 
individual petition 
19 East African Asians v United Kingdom App No. 4403/70 – 4429/70 and others, Commission Report adopted 
on 14 December 1973 
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policy of ‘Africanisation’, Amin gave all Asians in Uganda 90 days to leave the country, 
claiming that God had ordered him to do so in a dream.20 The UK refused them entry. As the 
government advisers had feared, a number of the Asians complained to Strasbourg. They 
could not do so under Protocol 4, but, advised by Anthony Lester, argued that deprivation of 
their right of entry to the UK had caused them humiliation and distress amounting to 
‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ in violation of Article 3. On 14 December 1973 the 
(former) European Commission on Human Rights found that the enactment of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 had breached Article 3 of the Convention. The case did 
not have to go to the Court, since the UK conceded. 
The second case was extraordinarily embarrassing for the UK: an interstate complaint brought 
by the Republic of Ireland, alleging that suspected terrorists held in administrative detention 
in Northern Ireland had been subjected to torture. The then Commission agreed; the Court 
held that the use by the UK of the methods of psychological pressure known as the ‘five 
techniques’ amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, again a violation of Article 3.21 
Both these cases therefore concerned the imperial – or at any rate colonial – past of the UK, in 
a way which threw into sharp relief the real reasons why the UK was so reluctant to make 
application to the ECtHR a reality (and in fact failed to incorporate the ECHR in domestic law 
until the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000).  
B. UK Occupation of Southern Iraq 
The issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction arose has resurfaced in relation to the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. On 7 April 2004 the Armed Forces Minister, Adam Ingram, stated that: 
the ECHR is intended to apply in a regional context in the legal space of the 
Contracting States. It was not designed to be applied throughout the world and was not 
intended to cover the activities of a signatory in a country which is not signatory to the 
Convention. The ECHR can have no application to the activities of the UK in Iraq 
because the citizens of Iraq had no rights under the ECHR prior to the military action 
by the Coalition Forces.22 
This assertion has now been fully discredited. In October and December 2005 the Court of 
Appeal heard appeals in Regina (Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence (The 
Redress Trust and another intervening).23 These were applications for judicial review brought 
by relatives of Iraqi citizens who had been killed in incidents in Iraq involving British troops. 
Five of the deceased had been shot by British troops, and a sixth, Baha Mousa, had died while 
being held in a British detention facility. The claimants sought judicial review of a failure by 
the Secretary of State for Defence to conduct independent inquiries into or to accept liability 
for the deaths and the torture. On the hearing of preliminary issues the Divisional Court 
declared that the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply in the cases of the first 
five claimants, but that in the case of the sixth claimant the 1998 Act did apply and the United 
Kingdom's procedural duties under articles 2 and 3 of the Convention had been breached. The 
Court held that a state can be held to have ‘effective control’ of an area only where that area is 
within the territory or ‘legal space’ – espace juridique – of the Convention, and therefore only 
                                                 
20 Wakabi, Wairgala "Idi Amin just won't go away", 30 April 1999, The Black World Today, 
www.blackworldtoday.com/views/feat/feat1142.asp 
21 Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom App no. 5310/71, judgment of 18 January 1978 
22 Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP, Ministry of Defence, Letter to Adam Price MP, 7 April 2004 
23 [2005] EWCA Civ 1609; : [2006] 3 W.L.R. 508 
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where the area occupied was that of another State Party to the ECHR. Accordingly, since Iraq 
was not within the regional space of the ECHR, the claimants’ cases were not within the 
jurisdiction of the UK. 
 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeals, and held that the jurisdiction of a 
State Party to the ECHR was essentially territorial; that if a contracting state had effective 
control of the territory of another state, it had jurisdiction within that territory under Article 1 
of the ECHR and an obligation to ensure Convention rights and freedoms; but that since none 
of the victims in the first five cases were under the actual control and authority of British 
troops at the time when they were killed, and since it was impossible to hold that the United 
Kingdom was in effective control of that part of Iraq which its forces occupied or that it 
possessed any executive, legislative or judicial authority outside the limited authority given to 
its military forces there, neither the Convention nor the 1998 Act applied. The government’s 
appeal with respect to Mr Mousa was also dismissed. That decision was heard by the House 
of Lords in April 2007, and at the time of writing the decision is awaited. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Divisional Court as to espace juridique. 
Lord Justice Brooke answered the question whether the ECHR could have extraterritorial 
effect as follows: 
It was common ground that the jurisdiction of a contracting state is essentially 
territorial, as one would expect. It was also common ground that: (i) if a contracting 
state has effective control of part of the territory of another contracting state, it has 
jurisdiction within that territory within the meaning of article 1 of the ECHR, which 
provides that “the high contracting parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in section 1 of the Convention”; (ii) if an 
agent of a contracting state exercises authority through the activities of its diplomatic 
or consular agents abroad or on board craft and vessels registered in or flying the flag 
of the state, that state is similarly obliged to secure those rights and freedoms to 
persons affected by that exercise of authority.24 
The first of these he referred to as ‘ECA’ (effective control of an area) and the second ‘SAA’ 
(state agent authority). For the purposes of SAA he held that none of the first five claimants 
were under the control and authority of British troops at the time when they were killed.25 For 
the purposes of ECA he asked ‘[w]as the United Kingdom in effective control of Basra City 
in August-November 2003?’ He held that it was ‘quite impossible to hold that the UK, 
although an occupying power for the purposes of the Hague Regulations and Geneva IV, was 
in effective control of Basra City for the purposes of ECHR jurisprudence at the material 
time.’26 
Philip Leach27 argues (and Brooke LJ appears not to disagree) that until 28 June 2004 when 
the Iraqi Interim Government assumed full responsibility and control for governing Iraq28 the 
UK was an occupying power as defined by the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth 
Geneva convention of 1949. Thus, in his view: ‘it is very clear that the exercise of authority 
or control by the United Kingdom over parts of southern Iraq in 2003-4 was extensive. For 
                                                 
24 Ibid para. 48 
25 Ibid para. 101 
26 Para. 124 
27 Leach (2005) op cit  p.457 
28 UN Security Council Resolution 1546 
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the purpose of the Strasbourg “effective control” test, it cannot be sensibly or convincingly 
distinguished from the control which Turkey has been found to exercise over northern 
Cyprus’29  Ralph Wilde has made similar arguments.30 Loucaides cites with approval the 
words of Sedley LJ in Al-Skeini: 
I do not accept Mr Greenwood’s submission that Bankovic is a watershed in the 
Court’s Jurisprudence. Bankovuis is more accurately characterised, in my view, as a 
break in the substantial line of decisions, nearly all of them relating to the Turkish 
occupation of northern Cyprus, which hold a member state answerable for what it does 
in alien territory following a de facto assumption of authority.31    
That, in my view, is the correct approach. 
3. TENSION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
My starting point in this section is a history of struggle and of disputed doctrine. The anti-
colonial struggles were largely aimed at securing independence within defined, overseas, 
territories – that is, the ‘salt-water self-determination’, in respect of territories separated from 
the colonial metropolis by seas and oceans to which the UN declaration of 1960 was 
directed.32 The non-state protagonists were the ‘national liberation movements’. The legal 
issues arising from the use of force by these movements, and the right or otherwise of other 
states to render support, including intervention, usually by the USSR, were explored in detail, 
almost at the end of the Cold War, by Julio Faundez, writing in the first issue of the first 
international law journal published in French and English and aimed at Africa,33 and Heather 
Wilson, with a background in the US armed forces.34  That was the period, up to the collapse 
of the USSR, when the use of force by self-determination movements – National Liberation 
Movements - was not, as is so often the case today, characterised as ‘terrorism’. 
International humanitarian law had been substantially updated and codified following WWII, 
in the four Geneva Conventions, dealing with wounded and sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of 
war, and civilians in the power of an opposing belligerent and civilians in occupied territory. 
These conventions were adopted in 1949 at the initiative of a private organisation, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.35  
As Hampson and Salama point out, there was no successful attempt to update the rules of 
conduct of hostilities until 1977, when two Additional Protocols were promulgated. They 
suggest that ‘this may have been partly attributable to the reluctance, after both the first and 
second world wars, to regulate a phenomenon which the League of Nations and later the 
United Nations were intended to eliminate or control.’36 However, these distinguished authors 
appear to miss the significance of the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, 
                                                 
29 Cyprus v Turkey (2002) 35 E.H.R.R 30 
30 Wilde, Ralph “The ‘Legal Space’ or ‘Espace Juridique’ of the European Convention on Human Rights: Is It 
Relevant to Extraterritorial State Action” part 2 (2005) European Human Rights Law Review pp.115-124 
31 Loucaides, ibid, p.401; Al-Skeini ibid para.193 
32 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) 
33 Faundez, Julio “International Law and Wars of National Liberation: Use of Force and Intervention” v.1 (1989) 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law pp.85-98 
34 Wilson, Heather Anne  International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990)  
35 For a useful brief summary of the history of IHL see note 16 in Hampson & Salama (2005) op cit, pp.25-6 
36 Hampson & Salama (2005) op cit, n.16, p.26 
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adopted in 1977. It is of course the case, as they note, that Protocol I dealt with international 
armed conflicts, up-dating provisions on the wounded and sick, and formulating rules on the 
conduct of hostilities, while Protocol II dealt, for the first time, with high-intensity non-
international armed conflicts. In this, they follow Doswald-Beck and Vité, in whose view the 
most important contribution of Protocol I ‘is the careful delimitation of what can be done 
during hostilities in order to spare civilians as much as possible.’37   
However, of a number of scholars recently publishing on the tension (or clash) between IHR 
and IHL, only William Abresch notes correctly that the Additional Protocols aimed to extend 
the reach of the existing treaties governing international conflicts to internal conflicts: ‘thus, 
Protocol I deemed struggles for national liberation to be international conflicts’38.  In other 
words, if an armed conflict is a struggle for national liberation against ‘alien occupation’ or 
‘colonial domination’ it is considered an ‘international armed conflict’ falling within 
Additional Protocol I.39  
This, I suggest, is the key to understanding the significance of both Additional Protocols. 
They were the response of the ICRC, and then the overwhelming majority of states which 
have ratified the Protocols, to the new world of ‘internationalised’ internal conflicts, in the 
context of armed struggle for sel-determination by National Liberation Movements.. 
International Humanitarian Law and internal armed conflicts 
Additional Protocol II provides for non-international internal armed conflicts in which the 
State Party is confronted by a well-organised armed group which controls part of its 
territory.40 It therefore requires the existence of a high intensity civil war in which the armed 
groups are ‘under responsible command’ and ‘exercise such control over a part of [the state’s] 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations’.41  
For this reason it could not apply to the conflict in Northern Ireland, but most certainly 
applied to the First Chechen War from 1994 to 1997. In the cases of the United Kingdom 
(Northern Ireland), Turkey (South-Eastern Turkey), and the Russian Federation (Chechnya), 
the state concerned has been at pains to deny the existence of an ‘armed conflict’, but has 
instead characterised the events as ‘terrorism’, ‘banditry’ or simply organised crime. 
However, it is also clear that for the purposes of Protocol I, the international community has 
given no shred of recognition to the situation of the Irish Republicans, the Turkish Kurds or 
the Chechens as involving ‘alien domination’ or ‘colonial occupation’, whatever the claims to 
self-determination of the Irish, Kurds and Chechens. The Irish and Kurds never exercised 
sufficient control over territory to justify the application of Additional Protocol II. The Irish 
Republicans for years demanded the ratification by the UK of the additional protocols, and 
UK ratification was delayed, despite the fact that, as pointed out, the protocols could have had 
no application. However, it should be noted that the Good Friday Agreement, which brought 
the Northern Irish conflict to an end, at least to the present day, recognised the ‘right to self-
                                                 
37 Doswald-Beck, Louise and Vité, Sylvain “International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law” n.293 
(1993) International Review of the Red Cross 94-119,  at 9 
38 Abresch, William “A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights 
in Chechnya” v.16 n.4 (2005) European Journal of International Law 741-767,  at 742 
39 Additional Protocol I, Article 1(4), and see Abresch  (2005) op cit p.753 
40 See Bennoune, Karima “Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003” 11 (2004) 
University of California, Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, 171-228, at 177, n.18 
41 Additional Protocol II, Article 1(1), and see Abresch (2005) op cit p.753 
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determination of the people of the Island of Ireland’, a long-standing demand of Sinn Fein. 
But this does not affect the general point made. 
The Chechen exception 
The conflict in Chechnya provides the essential context to the question of the tension between 
IHL and IHR. This was highlighted in a judgment of the Bow Street Magistrates Court in 
London.42 In his judgment of 15 November 2003 in the extradition case Government of the 
Russian Federation v Zakayev43, Senior District Judge Timothy Workman held as follows: 
The Government maintain that the fighting which was taking place in Chechnya 
amounted to a riot and rebellion, "banditry" and terrorism. The Defence submit that it 
is clear beyond peradventure that this was at the very least an internal armed conflict 
and could probably be described as a war… I am quite satisfied that the events in 
Chechnya in 1995 and 1996 amounted in law to an internal armed conflict… In 
support of that decision I have taken into account the scale of fighting - the intense 
carpet bombing of Grozny within excess of 100,000 casualties, the recognition of the 
conflict in the terms of a cease fire and a peace treaty. I was unable to accept the view 
expressed by one witness that the actions of the Russian Government in bombing 
Grozny were counter-terrorist operations. … this amounted to an internal armed 
conflict which would fall within the Geneva Convention’.44 
Another relevant feature of the First Chechen War was highlighted in 1996 by Professor Paola 
Gaeta.45 On 31 July 1995 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation delivered its 
decision on the constitutionality of President Yeltsin’s decrees sending Federal forces into 
Chechnya.46 The Court was obliged in particular to consider the consequences of Russia’s 
participation in the 1977 Additional Protocol II (APII) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.47 As 
Gaeta pointed out: 
The Court determined that at the international level the provisions of Protocol II were 
binding on both parties to the armed conflict and that the actions of the Russian armed 
forces in the conduct of the Chechen conflict violated Russia’s international 
obligations under Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Nonetheless, the Court sought to excuse this non-compliance because Protocol II had 
not been incorporated into the Russian legal system.  
The Court clearly spelled out that the provisions of APII were binding upon both parties to the 
armed conflict, i.e. that it confers rights and imposes duties also on insurgents. This statement 
was, in Gaeta’s view, all the more important in the light of the fact  that, at the Geneva 
Conference, some States expressed the opposite view, since they were eager to keep rebels at 
                                                 
42 The author provided written expert evidence for this case, but not on the point of internal armed conflict 
43 full text at http://www.hrvc.net/west/15-11-03.html 
44 Transcript of the judgment on file with the author 
45 Gaeta, Paola ‘The Armed Conflict in Chechnya before the Russian Constitutional Court’ (1996) 7:4 European 
Journal of International Law 563-570 
46 An unofficial English translation of this judgement was published by the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, CDL-INF (96) 1. 
47 The RF is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Soviet Union ratified both the 1977 Additional 
Protocols on 29 September 1989 to become effective on 29 March 1990. The Russian Federation deposited a 
notification of continuation on 13 January 1992. 
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the level of criminals without granting them any international status.48 This view had also 
found support in the legal literature.49  
Gaeta rightly emphasised the importance of the determination by the Court that the Russian 
Parliament had failed to pass legislation to implement AP II, and that this failure was one of 
the grounds - probably even the primary ground - for non-compliance by Russian military 
authorities with the rules embodied in the Protocol. In its determination of the case, the Court 
expressly directed the Russian Parliament to implement AP II in Russian domestic legislation, 
thus showing how much importance it attached to actual compliance with that treaty. 
Secondly, the Court underscored that according to the Russian Constitution and the UN’s 
ICCPR victims of any violations, crimes and abuses of power shall be granted efficient 
remedies in law and compensation for damages caused. 
The Second Chechen War and the Council of Europe 
Russia’s failure to obey the clear instructions of the Constitutional Court as to the 
implementation of APII has not been remedied to date, and the start of the Second Chechen 
War was accompanied by an equally egregious manifestation of non-concern by the Russian 
authorities in relation to compliance with the ECHR. 
On 26 June 2000 the Council of Europe published the ‘Consolidated report containing an 
analysis of the correspondence between the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and 
the Russian Federation under Article 52 of the ECHR’50 This report was prepared, at the 
request of the Secretary General, by three experts, Tamas Bán, Frédéric Sudre and Pieter Van 
Dijk, who were asked to analyse the exchange of correspondence between himself and the 
Russian Federation ‘in the light of the obligations incumbent on a High Contracting Party 
which is the recipient of a request under Article 52 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.’ The first request was dated 13 December 1999. The experts were asked to focus in 
particular on the explanations that the Secretary General was entitled to expect in this case by 
virtue of Article 52 and to compare that with the content of the replies received. They 
concluded that the reply given by the Russian Federation did not even meet the minimum of 
the standard which must be considered to be implied in Article 52 in order to make the 
procedure effective, and remarked: 
For example, it would have been legitimate to expect, as a minimum, that the replies 
would provide information, in a concrete and detailed manner, about issues such as the 
instructions on the use of force under which the Federal forces operated in Chechnya, 
reports about any cases under investigation concerning any human rights violations 
allegedly committed by members of the Federal forces, the detention conditions of 
persons deprived of their liberty by the Russian authorities and their possibilities for 
effectively enjoying the rights guaranteed by Article 5 of the Convention, the precise 
restrictions which have been put in place on freedom of movement in the area, et 
cetera. However, even after clarification by the Secretary General of what was 
expected, the replies lacked any such details…We conclude that replies given were not 
                                                 
48 See Cassese, Antonio ‘The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed 
Conflict’ (1981) 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly  415 
49 On Protocol II see, among others, Dupuy R. J. and Leonetti , T. ‘La notion de conflit armé à caractère non 
international’, in Antonio Cassese (ed), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Volume I, (1979) 272. 
50 Document SG/Inf(2000)24, at  
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human%5Frights/cddh/2.%5FTheme%5Ffiles/03.%5FArticle%5F52/01.%5FDocuments
/01.%5FChechnya/SG%20Inf%282000%2924%20E%20-%20SG%20report.asp#TopOfPage 
 11
adequate and that the Russian Federation has failed in its legal obligations as a 
Contracting State under Article 52 of the Convention.51 
The dubious role of the UK 
The United Kingdom has played a questionable role in apparently assisting President Putin to 
deflect international condemnation of his actions in Chechnya, especially after 11 September 
2001. Tony Blair visited Moscow on 4 October 2001, and Putin was especially grateful to him 
- for the fact that Blair was one of the few European leaders who had taken the initiative to 
assist Russia in April 2000, when Russia was coming under especially fierce criticism for its 
conduct of the war in Chechnya. 
On 6 April 2000 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) received a 
report by its Rapporteur on Chechnya, Lord Frank Judd, condemning Russian actions52. 
PACE considered that ‘…that the European Convention on Human Rights is being violated 
by the Russian authorities in the Chechen Republic both gravely and in a systematic manner’, 
and voted to recommend to the CoE’s Committee of Ministers that ‘should substantial, 
accelerating and demonstrable progress not be made immediately in respect of the 
requirements set out in paragraph 1953, [it should] initiate without delay, in accordance with 
Article 8 of the Statute, the procedure for the suspension of the Russian Federation from its 
rights of representation in the Council of Europe’.54 Most painfully for Russia, it appealed for 
an inter-state complaint of human rights violations to the European Court of Human Rights by 
other Council of Europe members.55 
This vote did not affect the cordial relationship Blair and Putin had already established. Just 
10 days later, on 16 April 2000 Putin visited London, despite the fact that he was still not 
formally President of Russia - he was only sworn in on 7 May 2000.56 His programme 
included tea with the Queen at Buckingham Palace. At a joint press-conference on 17 April 
2000, Blair welcomed Putin's commitment that all reports of human rights violations would 
be looked into by Russia. Referring to Putin as ‘Vladimir’, he rejected suggestions that Britain 
should distance itself from Russia because of events in Chechnya. Putin in turn stated that 
they had agreed on joint responses to problems of organised crime and narcotics. 
Thus, said Putin on 4 October 2001, Tony Blair had been instrumental in creating a new 
situation. He said: 
 it was just as important for us that the Prime Minister took his initial initiative and 
established his first contacts with the Russian leadership, with myself personally, we 
felt and we saw and we knew that our voice was being heard, that the UK wanted to 
                                                 
51 Document SG/Inf(2000)24, ibid – no page numbers in the web version 
52 PACE Doc. 8697, 4 April 2000, ‘Conflict in Chechnya - Implementation by Russia of Recommendation 1444 
(2000)’, Report, Political Affairs Committee, Rapporteur: Lord Judd, United Kingdom, Socialist Group, at 
http://assembly.coe.int//main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc00/EDOC8697.HT
M 
53 These included ‘… immediately cease all human rights violations in the Chechen Republic, including the ill-
treatment and harassment of civilians and non-combatants in the Chechen Republic by Russian federal troops, 
and the alleged torture and ill-treatment of detainees’, and ‘seek an immediate cease-fire’ 
54 Recommendation 1456 (2000)[1], ‘Conflict in the Chechen Republic - Implementation by the Russian 
Federation of Recommendation 1444 (2000)’, at 
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta00/erec1456.htm 
55 Reuters, 6 April 2000; via Johnson's Russia List 
56 See BBC ‘Putin flies into legal battle” 16 April 2000 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/714998.stm  
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hear us and to understand us and that indeed we were being understood and this was a 
very good basis upon which together we managed to work jointly and quite effectively 
to neutralise international terrorism in this instance in Afghanistan.57  
He was referring to April 2000. Action against Russia could only have been taken by the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of (Foreign) Ministers. Britain is a founder and leading 
member of the Council. Putin recognised, and expressed his gratitude, for the fact the the 
invitation extended to him so promptly made it absolutely clear that no action would be taken.  
Thus, Russia has added a new dimension of obduracy, or even downright non-compliance, to 
the relationship between the Council of Europe and its mechanism for human rights 
protection – and one of its largest and newest members.  
What really happened in Chechnya? 
A sobering commentary on the situation in Chechnya was provided by the parallel session, 
co-sponsored by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the International 
League for Human Rights (ILHR), which took place on 30 March 2005 during one of the last 
sessions of the UN Human Rights Commission.58 Several of the authoritative opinions 
expressed, by leading Russian actors as well as NGO representatives, are of special note. 
A Chechen victim of gross violations, Libkan Bazayeva (she was one of the applicants in the 
first six Chechen cases at the Strasbourg Court, referred to below), provided some striking 
casualty statistics. She used, for reference, the roughly 200,000 dead or missing after the 
Asian tsunami in December 2004. Not long before the start of the First Chechen War, 
Chechnya's population passed the one million mark. During the ten years of the two wars, she 
estimates that between 100,000 and 200,000 civilians have died, although she admitted that 
estimates vary considerably due to the difficulty getting accurate data. The official 2002 
census claimed that the population was 1,088,000, which she called a blatant falsification. She 
believed that the current population is now less than 800,000.59  
There was further disturbing information, from an independent source. As of 31 March 2005, 
a total of 32,446 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Chechnya (7,227 families) were 
registered for assistance in Ingushetia in the database of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). 
Of this total, 12,064 persons (2,617 families) were in temporary settlements, and 20,382 
persons (4,610 families) in private accommodation.60 
Anna Neistat, the Director of the Moscow office of Human Rights Watch, estimated that 
between 3,000 and 5,000 civilians had disappeared over the previous five years.61 Official 
Russian estimates of 2,000 for the same period, although more conservative, were still 
significant, she said. In the past, most abducted civilians were men between the ages of 
eighteen and forty and the abductions were usually carried out by Russian forces. That was 
changing: more women and elderly are being targeted. The ‘Chechenization’ of the conflict 
had transferred responsibility to the Chechen authorities and other Chechen groups that are 
                                                 
57 http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1679.asp 
58 Record of the Parallel Session, at 
http://www.ngochr.org/view/index.php?basic_entity=DOCUMENT&list_ids=378 
59 Presentation by Libkan Bazaeva, in the Record, ibid (no page numbers on the web site) 
60 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-6BLKXS?OpenDocument 
61 Presentation by Anna Neistat, in the Record, ibid (no page numbers on the web site) 
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pro-Moscow. With multiple groups involved in abductions, it was difficult to know where to 
inquire when a friend or relative disappears.  
All participants were perturbed by the fact that the European Union, which had in previous 
years introduced a resolution on Chechnya at the Commission had declined to do so in 2005. 
Rachel Denber, acting executive director of Human Rights Watch’s Europe and Central Asia 
Division said: 
It is astounding that the European Union has decided to take no action on Chechnya at 
the Commission. To look the other way while crimes against humanity are being 
committed is unconscionable. Thousands of people have ‘disappeared’ in Chechnya 
since 1999, with the full knowledge of the Russian authorities. Witnesses now tell us 
that the atmosphere of utter arbitrariness and intimidation is ‘worse than a war.’62 
Human Rights Watch had also published a 57-page briefing paper which documented several 
dozen new cases of ‘disappearances’ based on their research mission to Chechnya.63 
Many participants were frustrated by the apparent lack of interest by the international 
community. Tatyana Lokshina, founder of the Demos human rights information service, the 
best of its kind in Russia64, accused organizations like the United Nations, the Commission on 
Human Rights and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of not 
taking adequate measures. Particularly disappointing was the absence of any resolution at the 
Commission in 2005 condemning human rights abuses in Chechnya, although in her view the 
absence did not come as a total surprise. The last resolution was tabled in 2001, before 9/11. 
Since then, Russia has been seen as a valuable partner in the war on terror. Therefore major 
players were looking the other way, and allowing Russia to claim that Chechnya was an 
internal matter, or that it was also another front in the war on terror.65 
Action of a different kind was, however, being taken at that time, with significant results later 
in 2005. Both Libkan Bazayeva and Tatyana Lokshina were part of it. 
Making use of the Council of Europe’s  mechanism for protection of human rights  
In early 2000 the author began to work with the Human Rights Centre of the leading Russian 
human rights NGO Memorial, preparing applications for the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) at Strasbourg. Russia had ratified the ECHR in 1998. One of the first 
applicants was Libkan Bazaeva. Her case is described below. In March 2001 the author 
applied for a grant from the European Commission’s European Human Rights and 
Democracy Initiative to provide resources and support for the Strasbourg applications. In 
December 2002 a new litigation project, the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre 
(EHRAC), was founded with a grant of 1 million Euro from the EC. It works in partnership 
with Memorial, and with the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales. The 
author is Chair of its International Steering Group, and Tatyana Lokshina is one of its 
members.66 EHRAC is now assisting more than 100 Russian applicants, about half of them 
                                                 
62 Presentation by Rachel Denber, in the Record, ibid (no page numbers on the web site) 
63 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/21/russia10342.htm 
64 See www.demoscenter.ru 
65 Presentation by Tatyana Lokshina, in the Record, ibid (no page numbers on the web site) 
66 See, for full details, Bulletins, and case information, http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/ehrac; and the Russian site 
http://www.ehracmos.memo.ru 
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Chechen, before the Strasbourg Court; as well as conducting cases against Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Latvia. The project employs nine lawyers and support staff in Russia67, 
including the Vice-Chair of the Steering Group, the Chechen lawyer Dokka Itslaev, who 
works with extraordinary courage from the Chechen town of Urus Martan.  
On 24 February 2005 the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights delivered 
three resounding judgments in the first six cases to be brought against the Russian Federation 
in relation to the current conflict in Chechnya. On 6 July 2005 the Court rejected Russia’s 
application to the Grand Chamber, and the judgments became final.68 
These applications were lodged at the Court in early 2000, and communicated to the Russian 
Government in April 2000. They were given ‘fast track’ status, but nonetheless it was six 
years before judgments became final.69 This was not perhaps so surprising given the 
extraordinary load which Russian membership has now placed on the ECHR system.70  
All three of the judgments in the first six Chechen cases concern the deaths of the children 
and other relatives of the six applicants as a result of Russian military action at the end of 
1999 and the beginning of 2000. The applicants argued that the Russian government had 
violated their rights under Article 2 (the Right to Life), Article 3 (the Prohibition on Torture) 
and Article 13 (the Right to an Effective Remedy) of the ECHR.   
The bombing of the refugee column 
The first case71concerned three Chechen women, Medka Isayeva, Zina Yusupova and Libkan 
Bazayeva – mentioned above, who were victims of the bombing by the Russian airforce of the 
1000-vehicle civilian convoy which had been given permission by the Russians to leave 
Grozny by a ‘humanitarian corridor’ on 29 October 1999. The Russian government did not 
dispute that its aircraft bombed and killed the applicants’ children and relatives, but argued 
that its use of force was justified as ‘absolutely necessary in defence of any person from 
unlawful violence’ under paragraph 2(a) of Article 2. The Court doubted whether there was 
such ‘defence’, in the absence of any corroborated evidence that any unlawful violence was 
threatened or likely. The Court found that the applicants’ right to life had been violated since, 
even if the Russian military were pursuing a legitimate aim in launching at least a dozen 
powerful S-24 missiles, the operation had not been planned and executed with the requisite 
care for the lives of the civilian population. 
                                                 
67 As well as four staff in London, including the Director, Philip Leach, author of Taking a Case to the European 
Court of Human Rights (2006) 2nd edition Oxford: Oxford University Press 
68 See Bowring, Bill “Chechnya Justice” Counsel December 2005,  65-67 
69 A six year delay would in any domestic legal system constitute a violation of the Article 6 right to a judicial 
decision within a reasonable period. This is completely inexcusable in the context of the facts of the cases. 
70 On 21 April 2005 Anatolii Kovler, the Russian judge on the European Court of Human Rights, told a 
conference in Yekaterinburg that more than 22,000 Russian citizens have sent applications to the Court.  This 
figure is now much larger (See www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/04/1-RUS/rus-210405.asp). According to the 
Court’s Survey of Activities for 2004 (see http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/2004SURVEY(COURT).pdf), 
just 13 judgments were delivered against Russia in 2004, and while 6691 applications were lodged, 374 were 
declared inadmissible, 232 were referred to the Government, and 64 were declared admissible. Statistics 
published on 25 January 2005 showed that the Court delivered 718 judgments in 2004, of which 588 gave rise to 
a finding of at least one violation of the Convention. The Court also declared inadmissible a total of 20,348 
applications. The number of cases terminated increased by around 17.5% compared with 2003. In addition, it 
was estimated that the annual number of applications lodged with the Court rose to about 45,000 in 2004, an 
increase of approximately 16%. It is known that about 96% of all applications are declared inadmissible; this 
percentage rises to 99% in the case of Russia. 
71 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, Application nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00 
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Furthermore, the Court held that the Russian authorities should have been aware that they had 
announced a humanitarian corridor, and of the presence of civilians in the area. Consequently 
they should have been alerted to the need for extreme caution regarding the use of lethal 
force. The pilots’ testimony, that they attacked two isolated trucks, did not explain the number 
of casualties and was inconsistent. The attack took place over a period of up to four hours and 
was not a single attack. The weapons used were extremely powerful in relation to whatever 
aims the military were seeking to achieve. 
It is notable that the Russian judge, Anatoly Kovler, voted with the rest of the Court in these 
three cases. There was no dissent.     
The massacre in a Grozny district 
In the case of Magomed Khashiyev and Roza Akayeva72 the applicants’ relatives were killed 
in disputed circumstances, while the Russian forces were in control of the 
Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, in which the applicants resided. At the end of January 
2000 the applicants, who had fled, learned that their relatives had been killed. The bodies of 
the deceased showed signs that they had been killed by gunshots and stabbing. 
The Court found that where such deaths lie wholly or mainly within the exclusive knowledge 
of the authorities, just as in the case of persons in detention, strong presumptions of fact will 
arise in respect of injuries and deaths occurring. The burden of proof is on the authorities to 
provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation. Despite its strongly worded request, the 
Court never received the full case files and no explanation was ever provided. The Court 
found that it could draw consequential inferences.  
Although the government never concluded an investigation and those responsible were never 
identified, in fact the only version of events ever considered by the Russian investigators was 
that put forward by the applicants. The documents in the investigation file repeatedly referred 
to the killings as having been committed by military servicemen. The court concluded that, on 
the basis of the material in its possession, it was established that the victims had been killed 
by the Russian military. No ground of justification had been relied on by the government and 
accordingly there had been a violation of Article 2. 
The bombing of a Chechen village 
The case of Zara Isayeva73 concerned the indiscriminate bombing of the village of Katyr-Yurt 
on 4 February 2000. The Russian government did not dispute that the applicant and her 
relatives were bombed as they tried to leave their village through what they perceived as a 
safe exit. It was established that a bomb dropped from a Russian plane exploded near the 
applicant’s minivan killing the applicant’s son and three nieces. The government again argued 
that the case fell within Article 2 paragraph 2(a). The Court accepted that the situation in 
Chechnya at the relevant time called for exceptional measures. However, the court noted that 
it was hampered in that no evidence had been produced by the government to explain what 
was done to assess and prevent possible harm to civilians in Katyr-Yurt. There was 
substantial evidence to suggest that the Russian military expected, and might even have 
incited, the arrival of a group of armed insurgents in Katyr-Yurt. 
                                                 
72 Khashiev and Akayeva v Russia, Application nos. 57942/00 and  57945/00  
73 Isayeva v Russia, Application no. 57950/00 
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The Court held that nothing was done to warn the villagers of the possibility of the arrival of 
armed insurgents and the danger to which they were exposed. The Russian military action 
against the insurgents was not spontaneous but had been planned some time in advance. The 
Russian military should have considered the consequences of dropping powerful bombs in a 
populated area. There was no evidence that during the planning stage of the operation any 
calculations were made about the evacuation of civilians. The use of FAB-250 and FAB-500 
bombs in a populated area, without the prior evacuation of civilians is impossible to reconcile 
with the degree of caution expected from a law enforcement body in a democratic society.    
No effective remedy in Russia 
In all three cases the Court found that the Russian government had violated the applicants’ 
rights under Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy). In cases, such as these, where there 
were clearly arguable violations of the applicants’ rights under Article 2 and Article 3, the 
applicants were entitled to ‘effective and practical remedies capable of leading to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible’. The criminal investigations into the 
suspicious deaths of the applicants’ relatives had lacked ‘sufficient objectivity and 
thoroughness’. Any other remedy, including civil remedies suggested by the Government, 
where consequently undermined and the government had failed in its obligations under 
Article 13.  
Each of these cases was a microcosm of the large-scale violations of human rights committed 
by Russia in Chechnya. In each case the EHRAC lawyers argued that the use of force by the 
Russian government was disproportionate, and that there were no effective domestic remedies 
which the applicants could have pursued. Their arguments were founded exclusively on the 
principles of European Human Rights Law.74 
How the Chechen cases highlighted the tension between IHR and IHL 
One striking difference between IHL and IHR which, for some reason, is not the subject of 
comment in the scholarly literature on the tension between them which I now review, is that 
while IHL deals with the personal responsibility and criminal liability – under domestic and 
international law – of military commanders and politicians, IHR is exclusively concerned 
with state responsibility.  
That is, while the victims of violations of the laws of war, grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions – the relevant part of IHL for the purposes of my argument - may be individuals 
or groups, only individuals may be prosecuted and punished. In this regard, IHL is unique in 
international law, of which states are traditionally the only subjects. It may be asserted that 
while IHR is characterised by methodological individualism in that its subjects, even for 
minority rights law, are individuals, or the persons who make up relevant groups, it is 
rigorously collectivist when it comes to its objects. Whatever the post-modernist or 
“globalisation” arguments as to the weakening or disappearance of the state, the state must in 
every case answer to allegations of violations of IHR. This vitally important distinction, I 
would suggest, is the source of the many radical differences between IHL and IHR, 
manifested first of all in the many differences of terminology. 
                                                 
74 These were the first six cases – the Russian counterpart of Akdivar and others v Turkey (App No. 21893/93, 
Decision of 19 October 1994), in view of the importance of these decisions as test cases - and there are many 
more. The Court’s judgments provide a firm foundation for the work of EHRAC and others in enabling victims 
of gross violations of human rights to obtain an authoritative finding as to what befell them and their families, 
and to secure reparation.  
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As I noted above, William Abresch has analysed the implications of the Chechen judgments 
for the relationship between IHL and IHR.75 As he points out, the generally accepted doctrine 
has been that in situations of armed conflict, humanitarian law serves as lex specialis to 
human rights law. He does not notice, apparently, that the consequences of the application of 
one regime or the other would be quite different.    
This doctrine is apparently supported by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons76. The Court 
stated that it 
observes that the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) does not cease in time of war… In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be 
deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary 
deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, 
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct 
of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life… is to be considered an arbitrary 
deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by 
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of 
the Covenant itself.77 
What is the meaning of the Latin maxim lex specialis derogat lex generali? In his paper 
analysing the ‘fragmentation’ of international law Martti Koskenniemi pointed out that the 
rule described by this maxim is usually considered as a conflict rule, where a particular rule is 
considered to be an exception to rather than an application of a general rule.78 The point of 
the maxim is to indicate which rule should be applied. The other way in which such conflicts 
are dealt with, he continues, is through the ‘doctrine of self-contained regimes.’79 The latter is 
the situation in which a set of primary rules relating to a particular subject-matter is connected 
with a special set of secondary rules that claim priority to the secondary rules provided by 
general law.80 He gives as an example the fact that human rights law contains well-developed 
systems of reporting and individual complaints that claim priority to general rules of State 
responsibility.81 For Koskenniemi, the rationale for the rule is that the lex specialis takes 
better account of the subject-matter to which it relates. 
Nevertheless, he insists that ‘[a]ll rules of international law are applicable against the 
background of more or less visible principles of general international law.’82 These include 
‘sovereignty’, ‘non-intervention’, ‘self-determination’, ‘sovereign equality’, ‘non-use of 
                                                 
75 Abresch, William “A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights 
in Chechnya” v.16 n.4 (2005) European Journal of International Law 741-767 
76 Advisory Opinion 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996 
77 Advisory Opinion, para 24-25; see also ICJ Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, paras 102, 105 
78 Koskenniemi, Martti  “Fragmentation of International Law: Topic (a): The function and scope of the lex 
specialis rule and the question of ‘self-contained regimes’: An outline”, prepared for the Study Group on 
Fragmentation of International Law of the International Law Commission, at 
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79 Koskenniemi ibid p.4 
80 Koskenniemi ibid p.8 
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force’, the prohibition of genocide. The reader will recall my argument that the third of these, 
now recognised as part of jus cogens, acquired the status of such a principle, of a right in 
international law, as a consequence of the decolonisation struggles, of the national liberation 
movements. Thus, I have no argument with Koskenniemi’s general statement. I maintain, 
however, that IHL and IHR inhabit quite different moral universes; IHL was historically and 
remains a limitation on the use of lethal force, irrespective of the legality of the use of force. I 
cannot agree with Hampson that ‘the ultimate object of the two regimes is broadly similar, but 
they seek to attain that object in radically different ways’, although she accurately 
distinguishes the vitally important differences of result.83  
Noam Lubell notices that IHL and IHR appear to be quite different languages: teaching IHL 
to human rights professionals or discussing human rights law to military personnel can seem 
like speaking Dutch to the Chinese or vice versa.84 But he seems not to notice either that 
individuals or groups will rarely make claims under IHL; it is not that kind of procedure. But 
they are drawn, despite all the limitations, to seek to make use of human rights mechanisms. 
However, Abresch is interested in which rules are being and will be followed in the European 
Court of Human Rights, which now, in his view, applies the doctrines it has developed on the 
use of force in law enforcement operations to high intensity conflicts involving large numbers 
of insurgents, artillery, and aerial bombardment.85 He remarks that for IHL lawyers the law of 
international armed conflict would be the ideal for internal armed conflict. He calls this an 
‘internationalizing trajectory’.86 However, the Strasbourg Court has broken from such a 
trajectory, in order to derive its own rules from the ‘right to life’ enshrined in Article 2 of the 
ECHR. Abresch’s optimistic prognosis is that: 
given the resistance that states have shown to applying humanitarian law to internal 
armed conflicts, the ECtHR’s adaptation of human rights law to this end may prove to 
be the most promising base for the international community to supervise and respond 
to violent interactions between the state and its citizens.87 
This assessment differs sharply from that of Hampson, who clearly considers that the 
Strasbourg Court should take IHL into account, and believes that despite the fact that the 
Court has never referred to the applicability of IHL, ‘there is an awareness of the type of 
analysis that would be conducted under IHL.’88 In this she follows the ‘classical’ model of 
Doswald-Beck and Vité, who considered that ‘the obvious advantages of human rights bodies 
using [IHL] is that [IHL] will become increasingly known to decision-makers and the public, 
who, it is hoped, will exert increasing pressure to obtain respect for it.’89 Similarly, Reidy 
considered that in the Turkish cases the Strasbourg Court was ‘borrowing language from 
[IHL] when analysing the scope of human rights obligations. Such willingness to use 
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humanitarian law concepts is encouraging.’90 She too saw this development as ‘certainly 
welcome in so far as it contributes to a stronger framework for the protection of rights.’91 
Using the Chechen cases in which I participated as the centre-piece, I have sought to show 
that the European Court of Human Rights, despite the first generation limitations of the 
instrument it interprets and enforces, has been obliged to respond to circumstances in which 
applicants, representing themselves and groups of which they are part, have brought renewed 
symbolic and material content to human rights. I have insisted that IHL and IHR do indeed 
speak quite different languages, for reasons which are entirely obvious. IHL itself has been 
obliged to respond to the anti-colonial struggles and use of force by national liberation 
movements in the post-WWII period, but is extremely unlikely to find application in the 
strictly internal context of Northern Ireland, South-Eastern Turkey or Chechnya. In this 
regard, the Balkan conflicts are an exception, since the ICTY was able to treat them as 
international conflicts. 
4. THE PROBLEM OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS 
The final question concerns the scale of the potential violations committed by the United 
Kingdom in Iraq. Does the ECHR system have the capacity to deal with gross  and systematic 
contraventions of human rights standards? 
The first four decades of the work of the European Court of Human Rights, in the context of 
the member states of Western Europe, were for the most part concerned with mistaken or 
negligent government behaviour, even in the case of Northern Ireland. The conflict in 
Northern Ireland, including heinous acts of terrorism (rightly called by that name) by the IRA 
on the UK ‘mainland’, was always a conflict of relatively low intensity92, and the UK was 
clearly taking considerable trouble to combat terrorism and protect the lives and security of 
ordinary members of society without violating human rights. This, it is asserted, was not the 
case in Iraq. In my view, British actions in Iraq have considerably more in common with the 
campaigns conducted by Turkey against the Kurds, and Russia against the Chechens. What 
these two conflicts did not have in common with the UK in Iraq is that both took place within 
the territory of the state concerned. I have explored above the issue of extra-territoriality. 
The focus of this section is, therefore, ‘systematic’ violations, or, rather, ‘gross and systematic 
violations’ – as they are described in Menno Kamminga’s 1994 article93, to which I return 
below.  
‘Gross and systematic violations’ should be distinguished from ‘systemic’ violations, which 
have been analysed by Philip Leach in the context of the recent practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights.94 These are the ‘clone’ cases, the ‘repeat offenders’ which the 
Protocol 14 reforms to the European Convention on Human Rights are intended, in part, to 
address. In their Resolution of May 2004 the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers 
urged the European Court of Human Rights to take further steps to assist states by identifying 
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underlying problems – ‘as far as possible to identify… what it considers to be an underlying 
systemic problem’.95 
The issue of gross and widespread violations has been brought to a head by the conflict in 
Chechnya, and will without doubt rear its head in relation to Iraq, especially if cases like Al-
Skeini find their way to Strasbourg; although it was noticed in the scholarly literature as a 
result of the cases decided by the Strasbourg Court from the early 1990s against Turkey. 
It goes without saying that only a minimal range of – almost exclusively civil and political - 
rights are protected by the ECHR. And although both groups and individuals (as well as legal 
persons) may apply to the ECtHR, the Court has proved itself incapable of responding 
adequately to the claims made on it. This became starkly apparent in the 1990s, in relation to 
the Turkish Kurdish cases. 
The Strasbourg Court’s inherent weakness in dealing with gross violations 
The Kurdish cases exemplify the Strasbourg Court’s difficulty in engaging with 
circumstances of generalised armed conflict. During the early 1990s the conflict between the 
Turkish government and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) reached new levels of intensity. 
The government declared a state of emergency in South Eastern Turkey, in the course of 
which, in order to deny bases and territorial support to the PKK, state forces destroyed 
thousands of villages, and three and a half million rural Kurdish inhabitants became refugees 
in their own country. In 1993, the London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP)96, 
began sending an impressive series of test cases to Strasbourg. The most important of these, 
the basis for many of the later victories, Akdivar and Others v Turkey97, was decided in 1994. 
The problem inherent in bringing such cases was identified early on. In 1994, Professor 
Menno Kamminga warned that ‘[d]During the past four decades, the Convention’s 
supervisory system has generally responded disappointingly to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights.’98 He pointed out that ‘[t]he problem with gross and systematic 
violations is not so much that they are more complicated from a legal point of view. Rather, 
the problem is that their consideration tends to give rise to less cooperation from the 
offending state. This makes it more difficult to establish the facts.’99  
He foresaw that as a result of Protocol 11, which stipulated that inter-state applications go 
straight to the Grand Chamber, states might be even more reluctant than in the past to resort to 
the procedure. He therefore recommended reforms which would enable the Court to consider 
situations of gross and systematic violations of human rights proprio moto, that is, on 
information supplied by NGOs.  
In 1997, Aisling Reidy, Françoise Hampson, and Kevin Boyle, all three of whom represented 
Kurdish clients through KHRP, published what was in effect a follow-up to Kamminga’s 
article.100 They correctly pointed out that ‘[a] pattern of systematic and gross violation of 
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human rights does not occur in a vacuum, or as a result simply of negligence or default on the 
part of governmental authorities. Rather such a pattern requires the sanction of the state at 
some level.’101 They posed the question which haunts EHRAC and its Chechen cases as well: 
‘one can question whether the use of an individual petition mechanism is suited to addressing 
the nature of complaints arising out of such a conflict.’102  
Their answer was that recourse to international legal procedure can influence a political 
situation. They listed the ‘fruits’ of engaging legal proceedings: a determination of facts 
which are disputed or denied by the perpetrators; an objective assessment of the 
accountability of the perpetrators of the violations; the establishment of recommendations or 
steps (enforceable or otherwise) to be taken to remedy the situation; the determination of the 
legal standards being violated and therefore the identification of the standards of behaviour 
which a political resolution will be required to incorporate; the creation of an effective tool for 
political leverage; the prevention of the continuation of the scale of abuses as a result of the 
public and authoritative exposure of the situation: 
They argued that  
 [b]y using legal methods to investigate a situation of gross violation the perpetrators’ 
ability to act with impunity can be limited. Those in authority can be exposed and held 
accountable for their actions and hindered in their ability to continue such practices.103 
They recognized of course that the extent of any impact would depend on the effectiveness of 
the legal norms and mechanisms engaged. 
All of these considerations have of course informed the strategy of the partnership of EHRAC 
and Memorial. It was plain that the Chechen applicants in the first six cases were not 
interested in money, especially since the cases take so long. These extraordinarily courageous 
applicants were primarily interested in obtaining, from the highest court in Europe, an 
authoritative account of the events through which they lived (and their families died), and 
recognition of the gross violations they had suffered. In addition, they wanted to lay the basis 
for the prosecution of the individuals responsible. In their application for individual and 
general measures in the enforcement proceedings currently before the Committee of 
Ministers, they insist that the Russian Government should investigate with a view to the 
prosecution of Generals Shamanov and Nedobytko, in whose cases the Court’s findings of 
fact amount to the circumstances of war crimes.  
The three authors also highlighted the difficulties individual applicants faced in proving gross 
and systematic violations, especially where they claim that there is no domestic remedy, and 
that there has been no effective internal investigation. In many of the Turkish Kurdish cases 
the Commission (later, the Court) was obliged to carry out fact-finding in Turkey. In January 
1997 Mrs Thune, a member of the Commission, reported that there had already been 27 fact-
finding investigations, involving 12 members of the Commission, hearing 216 witnesses over 
39 days (302 hours) of hearings, generating 6,400 pages of transcripts.104  
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Despite this extraordinary effort by the Commission and the Court, applicants found it 
impossible to establish an ‘administrative practice’ in which first, such violations frequently 
occur, and second, there is an absence of effective remedies, often coupled with impunity for 
offenders: a ‘practice’, in particular, of torture. This amounts to deliberate violation by the 
State, authorized at the highest levels, rather than mere inadvertence or a failure of discipline 
in an individual case.  
It was the former European Commission of Human Rights which first coined the description 
“administrative practice” during its deliberations at the admissibility stage; this became 
“practice” at the merits stage. The Commission found the principle to be applicable in 
individual cases, for example in 1975 in Donnelly & others v. UK105. The Court finally dealt 
with the issue at the merits stage in 1978 in the notorious inter-State case concerning violation 
of Article 3 of the ECHR, Ireland v. UK.106 
However, in Aksoy v Turkey 107 neither the Commission nor the Court addressed the question 
of the practice of torture, which had been pleaded by the applicant, citing the lack of evidence 
produced by them, despite the fact that the reports of the UN Committee Against Torture and 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture were before it. Reidy, Hampson and 
Boyle ask:  
How then can an applicant adduce the kind of evidence required to establish 
practice?... a single applicant or group of applicants is put in a position of providing 
evidence they simply do not have the resources to deliver.108 
For obvious reasons, the issue of ‘administrative practice’ was raised by the individual 
applicants in many of the Kurdish cases from south-east Turkey. The Commission never 
found it necessary to deal with the issue. As a result, in not one of the Turkish cases was there 
a finding of fact on the basis of which the Court could decide that there had indeed been an 
“administrative practice”. This was despite the fact that in many of the decisions the Court 
found an absence of effective domestic remedies, thereby absolving the applicants from 
seeking to exhaust them, in circumstances which were tantamount to “administrative 
practice”, and otherwise inexplicable. ‘Administrative practice’ was also pleaded, using the 
same arguments, in the first six and subsequent Chechen cases, but has been similarly ignored 
by the Court. 
In essence applicants face the problem of persuading the Court that the Government in 
question, Turkey or Russia, is guilty not only of individual violations, but also of 
‘administrative practice’ as defined by the Court. Of course, the Court is reluctant to take such 
a bold step, since a finding of ‘administrative practice’ would amount to a finding that a state 
is deliberately violating human rights. 
But then the evidence in the Al-Skeini case (and evidence adduced in the associated courts 
martial109) tends to show that the decision to inflict such harsh treatment on Iraqi detainees, 
leading to the death of one of them, was taken at a much higher level than the soldiers who 
found themselves prosecuted. 
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In her Study for the Council of Europe on human rights protection during situations of armed 
conflict110, Hampson also noted the fact that the former Commission had recognised that the 
issue of repeated violations – which could also properly be described as “systemic” violations 
- raised distinct issues apart from, although linked to, ‘administrative practice’. Amongst 
other things, the fact that repeated violations could only occur as a result of deliberate 
government policy meant that domestic remedies were necessarily ineffective.  
It is highly likely that this will become an issue when Iraq cases against the UK begin to find 
their way to Strasbourg. I have already mentioned the sorry story of the courts martial 
following the murder of one Iraqi detainee and the systematic ill-treatment of others.  
Conclusion 
The Strasbourg Court is today in deep crisis, overwhelmed by the tidal wave of complaints 
coming from Russia.111 Russia’s refusal on 20 December 2006 to ratify Protocol 14 of the 
Convention112, on reform of the procedure of the Court, when every other Council of Europe 
member state has done so, appears to threaten the very future of the Court. The question 
posed by this chapter is whether the legitimacy of the Convention system is now in doubt. 
Will the Court have the capacity and intellectual resources to measure up to the challenge of 
cases relating to Iraq? 
This chapter has answered with a qualified “yes”. 
First, the Court has now, despite a set-back in the Bankovic case, developed a strong line of 
cases showing quite clearly that a member state can indeed be held responsible for violations 
of Convention rights committed outside its territory. This has now proved highly disagreeable 
for a number of states, especially those with a colonial past. There is an excellent recent 
example. On 11 January 2007 President Putin of Russia was asked by the former 
Constitutional Court judge and leading human rights promoter Tamara Morshchakova 
specifically about the refusal to ratify Protocol 14. Putin replied: 
“Unfortunately, our country is coming into collision with a politicisation of judicial 
decisions. We all know about the case of Ilascu, where the Russian Federation was 
accused of matters with which it has no connection whatsoever. This is a purely 
political decision, an undermining of trust in the judicial international system. And the 
deputies of the State Duma turned their attention also to that….”   
We can expect similar protests in future from the United Kingdom. 
Second, the Chechen cases discussed in detail above show that the Court will refrain from 
applying IHL to complaints by civilians of violations by members of armed forces committed 
in the context of armed conflict. IHL is predicated upon the existence of a state of war, in 
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which casualties are inevitable, and it is to be expected that civilians will suffer. By applying 
to these cases the rich jurisprudence through which it explained and extended Article 2 (on 
the right to life), the Court has shown that states will be held to account under the very much 
more stringent standards according to which a state must show that it has taken every possible 
precaution to protect the lives and welfare of civilians. 
Third, I have sought to answer the question whether the Court now shows itself to be 
paralysed in the face of gross and systematic violations of human rights, especially those 
committed in the context of armed conflict, of an internal or international nature. Again, the 
Chechen cases, despite the fact that decisions followed almost six years after the violations in 
question, show that the Court is capable of adjudicating in a decisive and creative manner.  
Whether of course it will have the courage to do so in the case of the United Kingdom is an 
open question; but there are already a number of first-rate precedents. 
   
